Ex Parte Poirrier et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,544 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Intern. Corp.

    349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 78 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding no material misrepresentation in part because a PTO examiner's reasons for allowance did not reflect that the PTO relied on the allegedly false applicant statements
  3. In re Hyatt

    211 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting Hyatt's claim that the Board failed to analyze the claims on an element-by-element and claim-by-claim basis and affirming the Board's anticipation determination
  4. Application of Royka

    490 F.2d 981 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 18 times
    Recognizing that if an independent claim is not anticipated, its dependent claims are also not anticipated
  5. Application of Bush

    296 F.2d 491 (C.C.P.A. 1961)   Cited 11 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6713. November 17, 1961. Marcus Lothrop, San Francisco, Cal., Harry W.F. Glemser and Bacon Thomas, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (R.E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Com'r of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions

  6. Application of Boyer

    363 F.2d 455 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7562. July 21, 1966. Rehearing Denied October 6, 1966. W. Philip Churchill, New York City, (Tyler S. Roundy, New York City, of counsel), for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (J.F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, and MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,120 times   473 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)