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Ex Parte Nurmi et al

10579137 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2013)
Ex Parte Nurmi et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Net Moneyin v. Verisign

    545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 279 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, to anticipate, a single prior art reference must not only disclose all the limitations claimed but also must disclose those limitations "arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim"

  2. Perricone v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp.

    432 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 147 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a prior-art reference anticipated claims 1-4 and 7, but not claims 8, 9, and 13, because the latter set of claims contained one fewer limitation

  3. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

    471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 134 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding prior art supplied no motivation to modify compound to include claimed structural features because no reasonable expectation of success

  4. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 149 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  5. Therasense v. Becton

    593 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 66 times
    Concluding that "[t]he erroneous jury instruction on the law of anticipation" did not upend a verdict of invalidity based on " 'anticipation or obviousness' " because the jury could have found the patents obvious

  6. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC

    683 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Finding entry of Rule 54(b) judgment proper with respect to Cadbury commercial products but not Cadbury experimental products

  7. Application of Jacoby

    309 F.2d 513 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6838. November 14, 1962. Henry Powers, Edward J. Mahler, Robert Alpher, New York City, and Robert H. Bachman, Hamden, Conn., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,973 times   986 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)