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Ex Parte Mutikainen et al

12811071 (P.T.A.B. May. 18, 2016)
Ex Parte Mutikainen et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,780 times   164 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"

  2. Liebel-Flarsheim Company v. Medrad, Inc.

    358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 1,312 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim terms are given the full breadth of their ordinary meaning unless a clear disavowal of scope is stated in the specification

  3. In re Hiniker Co.

    150 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 180 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Upholding rejection for obviousness even though prior art performed less efficiently than patent's device because it refused to read specification's operational characteristics into broader claims

  4. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  5. In re Self

    671 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Appeal No. 81-542. February 18, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 22, 1982. Roland T. Bryan, Stamford, Conn., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,105 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  7. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,973 times   986 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)