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Ex Parte Maskell

15067886 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 26, 2018)
Ex Parte Maskell

17 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,538 times   183 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. United States v. Adams

    383 U.S. 39 (1966)   Cited 478 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to ignore long-accepted factors in the field of wet batters to arrive at the claimed invention

  3. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  4. In re Bigio

    381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Affirming conclusion that toothbrush and small hair brush were in same field of endeavor because "the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes"

  5. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 87 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  6. In re Icon Health

    496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 46 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that "[a]nalogous art to Icon's application," which related to "a treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position," included "any area describing hinges, springs, latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the folding bed in" the prior art

  7. In re Klein

    647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 19 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 2010-1411. June 6, 2011. Louis W. Tompros, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr, LLP, of Boston, MA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Larissa B. Park and Katherine B. Dirks. Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitor. Before, NEWMAN, SCHALL, and LINN, Circuit Judges. SCHALL, Circuit Judge. Arnold

  8. In re Baird

    16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that obviousness had not been shown based on a single reference because the PTO had not demonstrated motivation to select claimed species from prior genus of millions of compounds

  9. In re Deminski

    796 F.2d 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that if a prior art reference discloses essentially the same structure and function as the invention, it is likely in the same field of endeavor

  10. Application of Burckel

    592 F.2d 1175 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 78-616. March 1, 1979. C. Wayne Stephens, Wilmington, Del., for appellant; Hoge T. Sutherland, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,105 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.132 - Affidavits or declarations traversing rejections or objections

    37 C.F.R. § 1.132   Cited 104 times   13 Legal Analyses

    When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected or objected to, any evidence submitted to traverse the rejection or objection on a basis not otherwise provided for must be by way of an oath or declaration under this section. 37 C.F.R. §1.132 65 FR 57057, Sept. 20, 2000 Part 2 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 6 is placed in the separate grouping of parts pertaining to trademarks regulations. Part 7 is placed in the

  15. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  16. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)