Ex Parte Jacobs

10 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,813 times   166 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. In re Donaldson Co., Inc.

    16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 206 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, which limits means-plus-function claims to the structures described in the specification and their equivalents, "applies regardless of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function language arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability determination in the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement determination in a court"
  3. In re Suitco Surface

    603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 36 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Suitco, we disagreed with the Board's broadest reasonable construction of the term "finishing the top surface of the floor," because the Board's construction "allow[ed] the finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless of whether it actually ‘finishes’ the surface."
  4. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use
  5. In re Mraz

    455 F.2d 1069 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 18 times

    March 9, 1972. Albert L. Ely, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio (Ely, Golrick Flynn, Cleveland, Ohio), attys. of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appealed from Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Rich, Judge. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges, and ROSENSTEIN, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of

  6. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,350 times   1045 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it
  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,124 times   478 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)