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Ex Parte Holyfield

14544089 (P.T.A.B. May. 23, 2017)
Ex Parte Holyfield

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,538 times   183 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 376 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  3. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.

    425 U.S. 273 (1976)   Cited 237 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a combination is obvious if a patent "simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform" and yields predictable results

  4. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition

  5. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 91 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted

  6. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 95 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure

  7. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  8. Application of Chapman

    357 F.2d 418 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 9 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7412. March 17, 1966. Elizabeth Hunter, Morristown, N.J., George B. Campbell, New York City, Arnold B. Christen, Washington, D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C., (Raymond E. Martin, Washington D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of product claims 1 to 4 and

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,105 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)