Ex Parte GAUSMAN et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc.

    737 F.3d 731 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 72 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding where the claimed value fell within prior art range, burden of production switched to the party opposing the obviousness challenge, while burden of proof remanded with challenger
  2. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner

    382 U.S. 252 (1965)   Cited 67 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Hazeltine the Court utilized all of the reference patent disclosure as prior art. But because that disclosure was insufficient to support a rejection under § 102(e) alone, the Court approved combining it with a second reference for purposes of determining obviousness.
  3. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  4. Hyatt v. Dudas

    492 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 22 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding the patent examiner's initial rejection in which the examiner found failure to satisfy the written description requirement because “the written description did not support the particular claimed combination of elements”— i.e., “while each element may be individually described in the specification, the deficiency was the lack of adequate description of their combination ”
  5. In re Giacomini

    612 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    No. 2009-1400. July 7, 2010. Jason Paul Demont, DeMont Breyer, LLC, of Holmdel, NJ, argued for appellants. With him on the brief was Robert L. Greenberg. Of counsel was Josephine A. Paltin. Thomas L. Stoll, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, VA, argued for the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Thomas W. Krause, Associate Solicitor. Before RADER, Chief

  6. In re Eli Lilly & Co.

    902 F.2d 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that an unexpected result in increasing the efficiency of feed utilization in ruminant animals was not sufficient when it was expected that the combination would increase weight gain in animals, as the prior art had invited experimentation in this area
  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,105 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,973 times   986 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)