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Ex Parte Fischer et al

10380591 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 28, 2007)
Ex Parte Fischer et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Pro-Mold Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics

    75 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 155 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims, our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition

  2. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  3. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal

    129 F.3d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 59 times
    Holding that reduction to practice does not occur until inventor knows embodiment will work for its intended purposes

  4. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  5. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  6. Meitzner v. Mindick

    549 F.2d 775 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 76-577. February 24, 1977. Rehearing Denied April 28, 1977. Eugene Sabol, Fisher, Christen Sabol, Washington, D.C., attys. of record, for appellants; George W.F. Simmons, Robert A. Doherty, Rohm Haas Co., Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel. Herbert B. Keil, Michael P. Bucklo, Johnston, Keil, Thompson Shurtleff, Chicago, Ill., David B. Kellom, Bernd W. Sandt, Midland, Mich., attys. of record, for appellees. Appeal from the Board of Patent Interferences. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and

  7. Application of Rosselet

    52 C.C.P.A. 1533 (C.C.P.A. 1965)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Referring to a "prima facie showing of obviousness by reason of the admitted ‘gross structural similarities’ of the art compounds, coupled with the fact those compounds are shown to have utility in the same area of pharmacological activity "

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,126 times   478 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)