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Ex Parte Cuomo et al

08657510 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 9, 2004)
Ex Parte Cuomo et al

20 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,170 times   66 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.

    802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 471 times   13 Legal Analyses
    Holding that notebook entries not witnessed until several months to a year after entry did not render them "incredible or necessarily of little corroborative value" under the circumstances and in view of other corroborating evidence

  3. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.

    810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 201 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that §§ 103 and 102 use the same definition of prior art

  4. In re Watts

    354 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 84 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding patent holder waived new argument on the scope of the prior art never raised to the PTAB

  5. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  6. Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus

    810 F.2d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 95 times
    Finding amendment during reissue proceeding to provide an antecedent basis for phrase did not alter substantive scope of claims

  7. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  8. In re Hyatt

    211 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting Hyatt's claim that the Board failed to analyze the claims on an element-by-element and claim-by-claim basis and affirming the Board's anticipation determination

  9. In re McDaniel

    293 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 28 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Noting "the Board is free to select a single claim from each group of claims subject to a common ground of rejection as representative of all claims in that group and to decide the appeal of that rejection based solely on the selected representative claim" in the absence of a clear statement asserting separate patentability of the claims

  10. In re Napier

    55 F.3d 610 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 37 times
    Determining proper standard of review is unnecessary because board's fact finding could be affirmed under more stringent standard

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,109 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)