Appeal No. 80-598. February 26, 1981. Rehearing Denied April 9, 1981. James E. Siegel, Henry A. Marzullo, Jr., Myron Greenspan, Scarsdale, N. Y., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent Trademark Office; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER, and NIES Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Berkman appeals the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals
Patent Appeal No. 8526. June 10, 1971. Cornelius J. O'Connor, Chicago, Ill., attorney of record, for appellant; Homer R. Montague, Washington, D.C., John J. Pederson, Chicago, Ill., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and LANDIS, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board
Patent Appeal No. 6790. May 18, 1962. Strauch, Nolan Neale and James E. Nolan, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions of Section 294(d)
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)