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Ex Parte Biercevicz et al

10320028 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 28, 2007)
Ex Parte Biercevicz et al

5 Cited authorities

  1. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  2. In re Kemps

    97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Upholding board's fact finding under less deferential standard of review obviated need for deciding propriety of using the APA standards

  3. Application of Ludwig

    353 F.2d 241 (C.C.P.A. 1965)

    Patent Appeal No. 7470. December 2, 1965. Emanuel Herbert Liss, Buffalo, N.Y., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 8-10 of appellant's application as obvious variations of certain prior art. These are all the claims remaining

  4. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,126 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  5. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)