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Ex Parte Barlow et al

12584809 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2016)
Ex Parte Barlow et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,538 times   183 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  3. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 149 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  4. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 87 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  5. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use

  6. Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage Ab

    766 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    Nos. 2013–1219 2013–1220 2013–1221. 2014-09-10 SCIENTIFIC PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., Appellant, v. BIOTAGE AB, Appellee. Frederick C. Laney, Niro, Haller & Niro, of Chicago, IL, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Paul K. Vickrey. Of counsel on the brief was David M. Quinlan, David M. Quinlan, P.C., of Princeton, NJ. George C. Beck, Foley & Lardner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Michael R. Houston, of Chicago, IL, and Debra D. Nye, of San Diego,

  7. Application of McLaughlin

    443 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 11 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8474. June 24, 1971. Norman Lettvin, Chicago, Ill., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; R.V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and RE, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. BALDWIN, Judge. McLaughlin has appealed from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals sustaining the rejection of claims 13, 14 and 15 in his application as unpatentable

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,105 times   470 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 184 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)