Elliott Goldberg

18 Cited authorities

Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.
469 U.S. 189 (1985) Cited 946 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that an incontestable mark cannot be challenged as merely descriptive
Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc.
786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 31 times 5 Legal Analyses
Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"
In re Cordua Rests., Inc.
823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Cited 26 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services
Royal Crown Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.
892 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Cited 20 times 2 Legal Analyses
Recognizing that indirect evidence, including of "competitive use, evidence that other companies use [a term] in combination with their own . . . marks, third-party registrations and applications for such combined marks," may be relevant for genericness
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Smith
828 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Cited 57 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding applicant's incontestable registration of a service mark for "cash management account" did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services
Real Foods Pty Ltd. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc.
906 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Cited 13 times 1 Legal Analyses
2017-1959, 2017-2009 09-21-2018 REAL FOODS PTY LTD., Appellant v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC., Cross-Appellant Jeanne M. Hamburg, Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, PA, New York, NY, argued for appellant. Also represented by Stephanie Spangler ; Kelly Watkins, Allentown, PA. William G. Barber, Pirkey Barber LLP, Austin, TX, argued for cross-appellant. Also represented by Tyson David Smith, David Armendariz. Wallach, Circuit Judge. Jeanne M. Hamburg, Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, PA, New York, NY, argued
In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd.
797 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Cited 15 times 1 Legal Analyses
Discounting advertising expenditures concerning FISH FRY PRODUCTS where the evidence relied on included ads promoting another mark
In re Northland Aluminum Products, Inc.
777 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Cited 49 times
Holding "[e]vidence of the public's understanding of term," for purposes of establishing if mark is descriptive, "may be obtained from any competent source, including .^.^. dictionaries"
H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc.
782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Cited 45 times 8 Legal Analyses
Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic
In re 1800Mattress.Com IP, LLC
586 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) Cited 12 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding "MATTRESS.COM" generic in relation to online retail store services in the field of mattresses was supported by substantial evidence
Section 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
15 U.S.C. § 2 Cited 4,455 times 31 Legal Analyses
In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.
Section 1051 - Application for registration; verification
15 U.S.C. § 1051 Cited 3,873 times 126 Legal Analyses
Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark
Section 1127 - Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
15 U.S.C. § 1127 Cited 3,003 times 98 Legal Analyses
Granting standing under § 1114 to the legal representative of the registrant of a trademark
Section 1052 - Trademarks registrable on principal register; concurrent registration
15 U.S.C. § 1052 Cited 1,597 times 274 Legal Analyses
Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"
Section 1091 - Supplemental register
15 U.S.C. § 1091 Cited 78 times
Stating that marks registered on the Supplemental Register "must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services"

Elliott Goldberg

18 Cited authorities

Holding that an incontestable mark cannot be challenged as merely descriptive

Explaining that although the "Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence," it cannot "disregard [evidence] without explanation" or "short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it"

Holding that certain words referring to key aspects of a genus of services were generic for those services

Recognizing that indirect evidence, including of "competitive use, evidence that other companies use [a term] in combination with their own . . . marks, third-party registrations and applications for such combined marks," may be relevant for genericness

Holding applicant's incontestable registration of a service mark for "cash management account" did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of that mark for broader financial services

Discounting advertising expenditures concerning FISH FRY PRODUCTS where the evidence relied on included ads promoting another mark

Holding "[e]vidence of the public's understanding of term," for purposes of establishing if mark is descriptive, "may be obtained from any competent source, including .^.^. dictionaries"

Reversing decision of TTAB that "Fire Chief," as applied to monthly magazine circulated to fire departments, was generic

Finding "MATTRESS.COM" generic in relation to online retail store services in the field of mattresses was supported by substantial evidence

In § 2 cases under the Sherman Act, as in § 7 cases under the Clayton Act (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325) there may be submarkets that are separate economic entities.

Requiring a filing of a Statement of Use to register a mark

Granting standing under § 1114 to the legal representative of the registrant of a trademark

Granting authority to refuse registration to a trademark that so resembles a registered mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"

Stating that marks registered on the Supplemental Register "must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services"