Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

10 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 240,420 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 219,947 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,455 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,046 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,593 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,366 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,154 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,176 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Department of Navy v. Egan
484 U.S. 518 (1988) Cited 531 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise," "outside nonexpert bod[ies]," including courts, cannot attempt to substitute their judgments for those of the executive branch on matters of national security
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

10 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that "unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise," "outside nonexpert bod[ies]," including courts, cannot attempt to substitute their judgments for those of the executive branch on matters of national security

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer