Bryce B.,1 Complainant, v. Sean J. Stackley, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 240,687 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,173 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,477 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,093 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (1993) Cited 12,601 times 23 Legal Analyses
Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
509 U.S. 502 (1993) Cited 12,372 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,165 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
507 U.S. 604 (1993) Cited 1,936 times 14 Legal Analyses
Holding that age and years of service, pension status, or seniority are "analytically distinct" and an employer may rely on one while ignoring the other
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters
438 U.S. 567 (1978) Cited 2,176 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context
Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp.
846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1988) Cited 413 times
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer

Bryce B.,1 Complainant, v. Sean J. Stackley, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

12 Cited authorities

Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that a "trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose"

Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision

Holding that "no single factor is required" to show a hostile work environment, including "whether [the acts are] physically threatening"

Holding that a trier of fact may infer discrimination upon rejecting an employer's proffered reason for termination

Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"

Holding that age and years of service, pension status, or seniority are "analytically distinct" and an employer may rely on one while ignoring the other

Holding that a district court was "entitled to consider the racial mix of the work force when trying to make the determination as to motivation" in the employment discrimination context

Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer